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Caste-Based Exclusion in Nepal's 
Communal Micro-Hydro Plants 
 
(With Specific Reference to Ghandruk) 
 
Discriminatory practices rooted in an ethno-caste system have dominated 
Nepal for centuries. This paper investigates the existence of such practices 
in Nepal's communal micro-hydro plants. A field research on the role of 
caste in influencing access to electricity was carried out in Ghandruk, 
Nepal. The research indicates that although the costs of establishing the 
micro-hydro plant is shared equally between user-groups, benefit sharing 
is highly uneven. This analysis demonstrates the need for development 
projects to be more aligned with socio-economic ground realities. 
    
I.     INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Energy Resources in Nepal   
 No significant deposits of fossil fuel are available in Nepal. Hence, it relies 
heavily on traditional energy sources. The most dominant energy resource in the country 
is biomass. Forest resources are under increasing threat due to the excessive dependence 
on fuel wood, fodder, timber, and other forest products. It is estimated that about 44,000 
hectares of forest area is degraded and deforested every year, while only about 4,000 
hectares are reforested (CRTN, 2005). In the meanwhile, the mountainous landscape and 
high surface runoff found across the country means that it has great potential for 
hydropower generation. It is estimated that there is potential for 83,000 MW (Mega-
Watts), of which about half is economically exploitable (Warnock, 1989). Large-scale 
hydroelectric installations have been constructed to tap this potential. According to the 
Nepal Electrification Authority, the total installed hydroelectricity generation capacity 
was 586 MW in 2002. By the same year, this power had been made available to 878,100 
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consumers through 1,982 Km (Kilometers) of transmission and distribution lines (CRTN, 
2005).  
 Unfortunately, all the electricity distributed is largely consumed in urban centers 
and lowland areas. Due to the rugged and unstable topography of the country, the 
national grid that produces more than 95% of the total hydroelectricity generated is 
unlikely to connect itself to the rural parts of the country in the near future. One of the 
responses to this problem has been the development of local micro-hydro plants that 
electrify rural communities in remote and inaccessible areas of Nepal. A brief definition 
of a micro-hydro is that it produces 5-100 kW (Kilo-Watts) of electricity to satisfy needs 
on a village level. According to Fullford, Mosley, and Gill (2000), electrification through 
Micro Hydro for rural communities is a boon as it has 'proved very successful as a tool to 
help (them) develop their economic position and improve their life-style' without getting 
connected to the grid.  
 
In the past, a combination of public sector credit through the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Nepal, private sector initiative, and technical and financial 
assistance through various agencies has enabled communities in remote areas of Nepal to 
own and use electricity through micro hydro plants. One important point to be noted is 
that a lot of these plants are owned and operated communally. Smith (1994) identifies 
communal involvement as one of the ‘key factors for the success of village hydro-
Electric programmes’ as he explains that ‘when a (communal) contribution, in terms of 
cash and/or labor is required, the villages will carefully consider whether the hydro-
electric scheme is worth the investment’. Based on the experience of the Aga Khan Rural 
Support Programme who has installed 15 schemes in Northern Pakistan, he states that the 
schemes with an element of community involvement are the ones that are most reliable 
and fully utilized (Smith, 1994). Commenting on rural electrification through micro-
hydro in Nepal, Fullford, Mosley, and Gill (2000) emphasize the role and importance of 
communal involvement by stating,  
 
'The installation of a hydroelectric generation system often involves a 
whole community so that the community needs to be mobilized. This 
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involves setting up management systems, so that people can be held 
responsible for running the system. Usually a hydroelectric scheme is 
subsidized from outside, but the local people contribute labor for the civil 
works that need to be done'.   
 
1.2 Caste and Ethnicity in Nepal 
 Discriminatory practices based on an ethno-caste hierarchy latently exist across 
Nepal today. The feudalists of Nepal that ruled the country for the past two and half 
centuries interlinked the legal system with the Hindu caste system. Consequently, the 
Nepalese society is highly stratified along the lines of caste and ethnicity with priestly 
Brahmans at the top, the Kshatriya (kings and warriors) just beneath them, and the 
Dalits, who are designated as 'impure', and 'untouchable' or acchut at the bottom (GSEA, 
2005).  
 The lack of laws regarding caste-based discrimination is not an issue as such 
practices were officially abolished in 1963. In fact, Nepal's new constitution of 1990 
describes Nepal as 'multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and democratic'. Furthermore, it declares 
that all citizens are 'equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe, or ideology'. 
Unfortunately, the enforcement of these laws is lax. In addition, discriminatory 
provisions still exist, such as the protection of 'traditional practices', which has been used 
to bar Dalits from temples and to permit continued caste discrimination. Consequently, 
caste-based discrimination, while diluted, remains today. 
 
The caste hierarchy of Nepal plays a strong role in determining who does and 
does not gain access to political and economic power and resources. Information on the 
incidence of poverty by caste in Nepal demonstrates how the caste system influences the 
ability of different groups in gaining power and resources. According to it, the Dalits that 
are at the bottom of the hierarchy had the highest incidence of poverty in both 1995 and 
2003. Similarly, the Brahman and Chettri that are on top had one of the lowest incidences 
of poverty for both years (GSEA, 2005).  
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 Having briefly discussed the role of caste in gaining access to power and 
resources in Nepal, this study seeks to examine the role of caste in determining a 
household's access to electricity and the ways in which caste can determine access to 
electricity in rural Nepal.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Site Selection  
In 2005, it was believed that 1,100 micro hydro plants existed in Nepal (CRTN, 
2005). Consequently, in order to assess the existence, causes and implications of caste-
based exclusion of micro hydro in rural Nepal, this study focused only on the ‘Ghandruk 
Micro Hydro Plant’. Specifically, the study focused on the status of the Dalits living in 
the village in regards to their access to electricity generated from the plant. The plant is 
located in ward number five of Ghandruk Village Development Committee in Kaski 
district of Western Nepal. The nearest road to the plant is at about 6 hours walking 
distance at a place called Nayapul which is 43 km from Pokhara (Khennas S., & Barnett, 
A., 2000).  The project started in November 1990 and was completed in 1992. It 
generates 50kW of electricity. The total project cost is USD 59,9162.   
 
 The Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant is considered to be one of the oldest and most 
successful communal Micro Hydro in Nepal. The local people provided labor worth USD 
3,504 during the initial stage of building the plant. Apart from that, the Canadian fund 
provided USD 13,743, ACAP (Annapurna Conservation Area Project) provided USD 
9,162 and the Agriculture Development Bank of Nepal provided a loan of USD 13,743 of 
which the Nepal government subsidized half. Most of the equipment needed for the 
                                                 
2
 All conversions from Nepalese Rupees to US Dollars in this paper are approximated and based on the 
exchange rates of July 19, 2007 as announced by the Nepal Rashitriya Bank. 
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project was designed and installed by Development and Consulting Service, a Nepali 
Non Government Organization. A British-based charity, ITDG (Intermediate Technology 
Development Group), now known as Practical Actions, which has a long experience in 
micro-hydro, provided technical support. The plant is managed by the communal 
Ghandruk electrification management committee. 
 
In 2001, the village had a total population of 4,448 or 1,013 households. The 
village has a heterogeneous population with Gurungs being predominant. They constitute 
62 percent of the total population, followed by Dalits (22 percent), Magars (six percent), 
Brahmins (five percent) and Chettris (five percent) (Interdisciplinary Consultants, 2001). 
Only, six wards in the village, however, are electrified from the plant: wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
and 8.  
 
As described previously, the Dalits are the poorest and most excluded caste group 
in rural Nepal today. Consequently, in this study, the Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant and 
the Dalits were taken as representatives for communal Micro Hydro and excluded groups 
in rural Nepal.      
 
2.2 Questionnaire Development  
 
The questionnaire was developed based on the objectives of the study. Thus, its 
first goal was to retrieve data on factors that might help determine if caste influences a 
household’s access to electricity from the Ghandruk Micro Hydro Plant. These factors 
were: the number of members per household, level of educational attainment of 
household heads, annual income per household, and the distance of a household from the 
micro hydro plant.      
 
To assess how belonging to an excluded group might limit one from accessing 
electricity, questions related to the following issues were developed:  financial condition, 
the initial distribution process, and the evolution of the use of electricity of respective 
households.  
6
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Finally, in order to assess the possible implications of caste-based exclusion to 
micro hydro plant and Nepal, questions regarding how the locals perceived the ‘existent’ 
unequal distribution of electricity in the village were developed. Since the village had 
recently undergone an insurgency, the political environment in the village was suspected 
to be volatile. Hence, direct questions regarding inequality and discrimination were not 
developed.  
 
2.3 Data Collection 
 
41 households were interviewed during the course of the research. For the field 
interviews, the sample was to be stratified along the lines of age, caste, gender, location, 
lodge ownership, and distribution of electricity in order to make it representative of the 
population of the electrified community in the village. No efforts were made towards 
including households from the none-electrified community in the remaining three wards. 
In addition, only the households that contributed labor when the plant was established in 
1991 were interviewed.   
 
 Before starting field work, a focus group discussion and a pilot test were carried 
out in the village. The focus group comprised of five locals. The pilot test was conducted 
with a local Dalit. During the fieldwork, relevant documents were also collected of which 
the most important ones were: the current subscription list, the latest survey of additional 
demand for electricity in the village, and the costs and revenues balance sheet of the 
micro hydro plant for the past three years.   
 
 Apart from local villagers, experts on micro hydro were also interviewed in 
Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Ghandruk respectively. In Kathmandu, interviews were 
conducted with the executive officer for NTNC (National Trust for Nature Conservation) 
and the Team Leader for Practical Action, Nepal. In Pokhara, interviews were conducted 
with the current director of ACAP and a micro hydro specialist at ACAP. In Ghandruk, 
interviews were conducted with one of the two operators of the Ghandruk Micro Hydro, a 
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member of the local electricity management committee, the chairman of the local 
electricity management committee and the manager of the Ghandruk micro hydro plant. 
 
3. ANALYSIS       
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
3.1.1 Data Collected   
 
In this section, quantitative data collected during field work, which are the most 
pertinent, are discussed. As seen in Table 1 below, the average WATTS, or amount of 
electricity individual households subscribed to at the time of the field research, is 235 
Watts. MEMBER is the number of members in each household. As suggested by the 
table, the size of an average household in the village is three. Similarly, the average 
INCOME, total annual income of households converted in US Dollars, is USD 745. 
EDUCATION is the years spent in school by the head of the interviewed household. The 
total years spent in school by an average household head in the village is three years. 
Finally, DISTANCE, is the total time in minutes it takes for an individual to walk from 
their house to the plant. Compared to other options, i.e. measuring the distance in meters, 
this approach was chosen because most villagers talked about distance in terms of 
minutes (on foot) and not meters. In addition, this was also more convenient for data 
collection.    
Table 1:  
Summary Statistics for Variables 
 WATTS MEMBERS INCOME EDUCATION DISTANCE 
Mean 235 3 745 3 14 
Median 100 3 550 0 15 
Maximum 1400 6 3668 10 25 
Minimum 25 1 0 0 5 
Std. Dev 310 2 936 4 5 
 
In the electrified community of the village, the micro hydro provides electricity to 
a combination of 284 Gurung, Dalit, and other castes. Out of the 284, 216 (78 percent) 
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are Gurung, 53 (19 percent) are Dalits, and nine (three percent) are of other caste. At the 
start, the tariff was set at a flat rate of USD .0076 per watt for ordinary households and of 
USD.0115 per watt for lodges. Later, beginning April 14, 2007, the village electrification 
management committee revised its policies and tariffs were set at a flat rate of USD.0122 
per watt for ordinary households and at USD.0158 per watt for everyone using electricity 
for commercial purposes. Households are fitted with low cost circuit breakers. Power is 
automatically cut off when consumers use more than the wattage allocated.  
 
The average monthly revenue generated by the plant calculated for the past two 
and a half year based on the original tariff policy charging USD .0076 per watt for 
ordinary households and USD.0115 per watt for lodges is USD 436. Average monthly 
revenue generated by the plant for the past three months after it imposed its revised tariff 
policy charging a flat rate of USD.0122 per watt for ordinary households and at 
USD.0158 per watt for everyone using electricity for commercial purposes is USD 578. 
As seen in Table 2 below, the average monthly revenue and cost of the plant for the past 
32 months has been approximately USD 457 and USD 284.  
 
Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics for Monthly Revenues and Costs of the Plant (2004-2007) 
 Revenue (USD) Cost (USD) 
Mean 457 284 
Median 440 293 
Standard Deviation 60 95 
Minimum 403 161 
Maximum 667 482 
Count (Months) 32 32 
  Source: Field Study, 2007 
 
In 2006, the electrification management committee decided to replace many of its 
old equipment in the plant, i.e. nozzles, LC Board, runner, etc. It cost them about USD 
8,398. In addition, in 2007, the committee decided to buy new police switches worth 
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USD 2,443. According to residents, these are the only major operation and maintenance 
costs incurred for the plant ever since it established in 1991. Currently, the committee has 
around USD 2,290 in a bank called the Dwitiya Sanstha (Secondary Institution) in 
Pokhara, Nepal. Several parts will require changing in the immediate future, i.e. the 
generator that might not work for more than an additional 5 years. If replaced, it will cost 
the villagers about USD 7,635.  
 
The plant is managed by the Ghandruk Electrification Management Committee. 
Initially, the plan was for the committee to consist of eleven executive members: six 
nominated from each of the wards where the scheme provides service, three nominated 
from Ghandruk Yuwa Samuha (Ghandruk Youth Club), one nominated from among the 
ACAP officials, and the Ghandruk VDC chairperson as an ex-officio member. However, 
after the Maoist insurgency, no 'official' electricity management committee exists in 
Ghandruk as all the original and elected committee members have been chased out by the 
rebels. The committee has appointed three staff – one manager and two operators – to 
manage and operate the system. Each receives approximately USD 61 as a monthly 
salary.  
 
3.1.2 Stratified Sample 
 
As previously mentioned, an effort was made towards making the sample 
representative of the population based on age, caste, gender, location, lodge ownership, 
and distribution of electricity. Consequently, the variation in the samples collected 
suggests that some success has been achieved in doing so.  
 
As seen in figure 1, the population of the electrified community is constituted by 
22 lodges, 53 Dalit households, and 209 other households. In the meanwhile, the sample 
is constituted by five lodges, nine Dalit households, and 27 others. Consequently, the 
percentage of lodges (12%) and Dalit households (20%) in the sample is very close to the 
percentage of lodges (8%) and Dalit households (19%) in the population of the electrified 
community.  
10
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 Figure 1: 
Comparing the representation of Dalits and Lodges in the Sample and Population 
 
  Source: Field Survey, 2007 
 
Similarly, as seen in figure 2, success has also been achieved in making the 
distribution of electricity in the sample representative of that in the population. In figure 
5, the x and y axes represent the households and the Watts of electricity they are 
subscribed to. The households in both the sample and population in the figure have been 
arranged in ascending order (based on Watts subscribed) from left to right. As can be 
seen, the curves of distribution of electricity for both the sample and population are 
almost identical.  
Figure 2: 
Comparing the Distribution of Electricity in the Sample and Population 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2007 
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An effort was also made towards making the sample representative of the wards 
and women in the village. In regards the wards, success was achieved as out of the 41 
households, 14, 10, 5, 1, 5, and 6 were from wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively. In 
addition, 10 out of the 41 interviewees were women. Interviewing more women was 
difficult considering that household heads in Ghandruk were predominantly male. 
Finally, some success was gained in including as much elder people in the sample. The 
logic behind trying to do so was that they were most likely to know about the MHP since 
its installation in 1991. The mean age for the 41 interviewees was 57 years, with the 
oldest interviewee being 83 years old and the youngest being 27 years old (See Table 3 
below).  
 
      Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistics for AGE in the sample 
AGE 
Mean 57 
Median 59 
Minimum 27 
Maximum 83 
Count 41 
    Source: Field Survey, 2007 
3.2 Distribution 
3.2.1 Regression Analysis 
 
In order to investigate if caste plays a role in determining a household’s access to 
electricity, a cross-section regression analysis in OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) was run 
based on data collected from 41 households in Ghandruk. The regression model used in 
order to do so is as follows,   
 
WATTS =   β0+β1MEMBERS+β2EDUCATION+β3LODGE+β4INCOME 
 +β5CASTE+Β6DISTANCE   
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Descriptions of the variables used in the model can be seen in Table 4 below,  
 
Table 4: 
Describing the Variables 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
WATTS Subscribed Electricity per household 
INCOME Annual income per households (in USD) 
LODGE Dummy Variable: Lodges - 1 and Others - 0 
EDUCATION Years spent in school per household head 
MEMBERS No. of members per household 
DISTANCE Minutes taken to walk to the MHP 
CASTE Dummy Variable: Dalits-1 and Others – 0 
 
The first independent variable is MEMBERS. Since, the more members, the higher 
demand for electricity in a household and vice versa, it is hypothesized that MEMBERS 
should positively correlate with WATTS. The second independent variable in the model is 
EDUCATION. Since one would expect that with more education, a household would be 
aware of the benefits of electricity and want more electricity, it is hypothesized to have a 
positive relation with WATTS.  The third independent variable used in the model is 
LODGE. Since the lodge owners are the local elites, it is hypothesized that lodges will 
have access to more electricity compared to ordinary households. The fourth variable 
used is INCOME. Since, a higher income means that a household is capable of paying for 
more electricity compared to others; it is expected it to have a positive relation with 
WATTS. The fifth variable in the model is CASTE. Since, the Dalit are a marginalized 
group, they are expected to have access to significantly less WATTS compared to other 
castes. Finally, the last independent variable is DISTANCE. The further a household is 
from the plant, the more expensive it is to provide electricity to it and vice versa. Hence, 
it is expected to have a negative relationship with WATTS.  
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Table 5: 
Cross-Section Growth Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: WATTS 
Method: Ordinary Least Squares 
Included observation: 41 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT T-STAT PROB.  
    
  
MEMBERS 19.22 1.06 0.29 
  (18.1)    
INCOME 0.06** 2.17 0.03 
  (0.03)    
LODGE 696.73*** 8.11 0 
  (85.81)    
EDUCATION -2.08 -0.27 0.7 
  (7.43)    
CASTE -121.49* -1.76 0.08 
  (68.87)    
DISTANCE -2.93 -0.51 0.60 
  (5.65)    
OBSERVATIONS 41    
      
R-SQUARED 0.81    
      
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.78    
      
OBS*R-SQUARED 19.32     
 
As can be seen in the OLS estimations of the regression in Table 5, the significant 
variables are INCOME, WEALTH, and CASTE. All other variables correlate 
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insignificantly to WATTS. The coefficient for INCOME is .06. This means that a USD 1 
increase in annual income is associated with an increase of subscribed WATTS of .06. The 
coefficient for LODGE is 696.73. This means that an average LODGE has access to 
significantly more Watts than an ordinary household. Finally, the coefficient for CASTE 
is -121.49. This indicates that, a Dalit household in Ghandruk compared to households 
belonging to other caste groups subscribes significantly less electricity. Clearly, the 
regression analysis indicates that caste-based exclusion from access to electricity does 
exist in Ghandruk. 
 
In order to see if there was a problem with imperfect multicollinearity, A the 
correlation matrix between the independent variables was constructed and investigated to 
make sure none of them had very high correlations (see Table 6 below).  In addition, 
comparing the observed R-Squared with critical values in the chi-square table, the null 
that there is heteroskedascticity in the model can be rejected. 
 
Table 6: 
Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
  INCOME LODGE EDUCATION MEMBERS DISTANCE CASTE 
INCOME 1 0.52 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.32 
LODGE 0.52 1 -0.01 -0.06 0.25 -0.18 
EDUCATION 0.13 -0.01 1 0.44 -0.401 -0.13 
MEMBERS -0.07 -0.06 0.44 1 -0.11 0.36 
DISTANCE -0.01 0.25 -0.4 -0.11 1 0.11 
CASTE -0.32 -0.18 -0.13 0.36 0.11 1 
 
3.2.2 Further Evidence 
 
As we see in Figure 3 below, out of the 283 electrified households, 216 belong to 
the Gurung, 53 belong to the Dalits, and nine belong to other caste groups. Consequently, 
the Gurung households that make 78% of the population have access to 42,745 Watts or 
92% of electricity while the Dalits that make for 19% of the population have access to 
15
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2,410 Watts or 5% of electricity. The others that make for 3% of the population have 
access to 1,575 Watts or 3% of the electricity.  
 
Figure 3: 
Distribution of Population and Electricity across Caste-Groups 
 
 Source: Field Survey, 2007  
 
In addition, while a household belonging to a Gurung or 'other' caste group, on 
average, have access to 198 and 175 Watts respectively, a Dalit household, on average 
has access to 46 Watts of electricity (for more details see Table 7 below). 
        
Table 7:  
Descriptive Statistics: Access to Electricity of Different Ethnic Groups 
 GURUNG DALITS OTHERS 
Mean 198 46 175 
Minimum 25 20 25 
Maximum 1400 100 350 
Sum 42745 2410 1575 
Count 216 53 9 
 Source: Field Survey, 2007 
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 Given the fact that the labor contributions from the village were equally 
distributed between the households, the argument goes that benefit sharing should be 
equal too and the Dalits that make for 19% of the population should gain access to 19% 
of the electricity generated. One way in which the inherent inequality in distribution 
could be justified is if the Dalits were not to demand for additional electricity. However, 
this is not the case as we see in Figure 4. The total addition demand of the Dalits for 
electricity is 28.175 kW at an average of 370.36 Watts per household, almost as much as 
per household demand of the Gurung households which is 383.16 Watts. Similarly, per 
household demand of the Dalits is more than that of those belonging to other castes 
(150.69 Watts) and the village itself (329.10 Watts).   
 
Figure 4: 
Additional Electricity Demanded in 2007 
 
 Source: Field Survey, 2007 
 
3.3 Determinants of Exclusion 
3.3.1 Financial Status 
 
 In the regression analysis, it was observed that both LODGE and INCOME were 
significantly related to WATTS. Lodge owners are the local elites in the village. As 
suggested by figure 1, the Dalits are the poorest caste-group in Nepal. In addition, they 
17
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have the lowest annual income in the electrified community of the village at USD 138 per 
year per household compared to USD 2,084 and USD 687 per year per household for 
lodge owners and others (households that are neither Dalits nor lodges). These 
calculations are based on data collected from the sample of 41 households. Clearly, 
financial status does play a large role in determining who does and who does not gain 
access to electricity. Consequently, the poverty of the Dalits can be put down as one of 
the reasons why they have access to negligible amount of electricity. Nevertheless, 
looking at the large demand for additional electricity made by the Dalits (28.175 kW) and 
the extremely low tariff rates at which electricity is available in Ghandruk, there seem to 
be other factors too that might have contributed to the unequal distribution.   
 
3.3.2 Social Status  
 
 The distribution pattern that was set in 1991 (Phase I and II), is not set in stone. 
Throughout the past 15 years or so, local households have been trading their electricity 
with one another with out any interference of the local electrification management 
committee. In the electrified community of Ghandruk, households are free to buy and sell 
electricity from one another. Consequently, it is possible for a household that had a 
certain Watts of electricity in 1991 to have more electricity today. It can buy or even rent 
electricity from a neighbor or relative. Similarly, new households established in the 
village after the distribution of electricity in 1991 can have access to electricity through 
the same process. The interviewed experts made it clear that all the electricity generated 
from the plant is distributed and the electrification management committee can no longer 
provide additional electricity to anyone. Nevertheless, due to trading of electricity among 
villagers, the distribution pattern is always changing.      
 
 As seen in figure 5 below, out of the five lodges that were included in the sample, 
two stated that their subscribed wattage had remained the same while three expressed that 
they had increased their subscribed wattage over the years. Similarly, out of the eight 
Dalit households, six had experienced no change while the subscribed wattage of two had 
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actually decreased. Finally, for the group that fell in neither category, 19 had experienced 
no change while nine had increased their access to electricity.    
 
Figure 5: 
Changes in Access to Electricity 
 
  Source: Field Survey, 2007  
 
 Similarly, in 1999, 16 lodges had subscribed to a total of 17 kW of electricity at a 
rate of 1.06 kW per lodge. At that time, the lodges had subscribed to 33% of the total 
electricity generated from the MHP (Thumim, 1999). In 2007, however, 22 lodges are 
subscribed to a total of 18.25 kW of electricity at a rate of 829.4 Watts per lodge. Today, 
the lodges have subscribed to 38% of the total electricity generated from the plant. In a 
sense, the access to electricity of lodge owners over the years has increased by 
approximately 15%.       
 
 Clearly, the scenario presented does not look good for an excluded group like the 
Dalits. When locals in a community like Ghandruk constantly trade electricity with one 
another, marginalized groups like the Dalit have the most difficulty in acquiring more 
electricity due to their social status. Apart from financial incentives, locals selling or 
renting electricity are bound to have a social incentive to do business with a household 
that belongs to one's own caste group or one that can be considered an equal. Hence, 
social status is another fact that affects distribution. 
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3.3.3 Lack of Awareness 
  
 Finally, one another factor apart from wealth, and status that explains the highly 
uneven distribution of electricity in Ghandruk is the way in which electricity distribution 
took place in 1991.  The distribution of electricity in 1991 took place in two phases. In 
the first phase, the management committee went to households and asked them how 
much electricity they wanted. Consequently, at the time, there was a demand of only 
33.775 kW. This was problematic to the committee and the villagers as selling only 
33.775 kW would not generate the needed revenue. Consequently, the committee and 
villagers together persuaded the lodge-owners to purchase the surplus electricity. 
 
   Table 8 below compares the distribution of electricity in 1991 after the first 
phase when only 33.775 kW were distributed with the current subscription of electricity 
in Ghandruk. The standard deviation and mean for 1991 are 180.58 and 141.31 
respectively. The coefficient of variation for 1991 is thus 1.28. This implies that 
distribution of electricity after the first phase itself was highly uneven. However, the 
standard deviation and mean for 2007 are 239.52 and 171.05 respectively. This means 
that the coefficient of variation for 2007 is 1.4. Clearly, the data indicates that the 
coercing of lodges to subscribe to more electricity in the second phase of distribution 
increased the uneven distribution of electricity in Ghandruk at the cost of the Dalits who 
contributed equally.     
     Table 8: 
Comparing Distribution in 1991 and 2007 
 1991 2007 
Mean 141 171 
Standard Deviation 180  239 
Minimum 25 20 
Maximum 1000 1400 
Count 239 284 
Source: Calculations based on current subscription  
list and data from Kapali, 1997 
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 Interestingly, unlike in 1991, when there was a demand for only 33.775 kW, 
today demand for electricity in the village has increased substantially as the latest survey 
shows that the total demand for additional electricity in the six wards is 71.415 kW (see 
figure 7). 
 
According to basic economic principles, something must have changed 
tremendously for this surge in demand. The change could have been in the population of 
the villages, the income of the villagers, prices of related goods, expectations of villagers, 
or the taste and preferences of the villagers. Many in the village believe that the 
population of the village, instead of increasing, has decreased over the years as many 
people are emigrating abroad and to the cities in search for better opportunities. 
Similarly, the income of the villagers could not have been a factor either as there does not 
seem to be any sort of economic boom in the village with the recent Maoist insurgency 
that lasted for more than ten years. Consequently, the reason why demand for electricity 
has increased over the years is because people have now become aware of the widespread 
uses and benefits of electricity that they were not during the implementation stage of the 
project. 
 
When the villagers where asked why they demanded for so little electricity in 
1991, 46% of the interviewees replied that they did so due to unawareness of the 
widespread uses of electricity. In addition, 12 % of the respondents pointed out a mixture 
of unawareness and income constraints as being the reason. Similarly, 10% of the 
respondents stated that the wattage they subscribed to was their best option, 15% stated 
that they had financial constraints and 17% of the respondents cited other reasons. 
Consequently, when the experts were asked if the locals might have demanded for more 
electricity in the first phase had they been better educated about the benefits of electricity 
during the implementation stage, all of them agreed. Clearly, the distribution of 
electricity would have been more equitable had things been different right from the start.    
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Figure 6: 
Reasons for Limited Demand in 1991 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2007  
 
 Unfortunately, the people that suffered most from this policy error were the poor 
and excluded groups (i.e. Dalits) that were least likely to have known about the 
widespread benefits and uses of electricity. During the interviews, many locals expressed 
that back in 1991 the only electrical appliances they properly knew of were light bulbs: 
most didn’t know how electricity could be useful, apart from lighting a bulb on the inside 
and outside of the house. In addition, it appears that one of the other deterrents for the 
locals was the fear that electricity is something dangerous: electricity can cause short 
circuits and shock people to death.    
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
Donor funded micro hydro projects requiring communal involvement (equal cost 
sharing among community members) have come a long way, yet the unequal sharing of 
benefit based on an age old discriminatory caste system is unjust. Apart from being 
unfair, such practices threat the long run stability of micro hydro plants by brewing 
animosity amongst the subalterns. During the field study in Ghandruk, it was found that 
talks of an equal redistribution of electricity had been frequently brought up in local 
meetings over the past 15 years. Similarly, many of the Dalits that were interviewed 
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expressed that they felt exploited and mistreated by the powerful and the system. 
Consequently, whilst successfully bringing electricity and the benefits of modernization 
to a few local elites, the micro hydro plant has bred immense animosity in the village 
between the haves and the have not’s. If the ‘past’ Maoist insurgency and the ongoing 
upsurge in the plains of Nepal is anything to go by, one can see how the caste-based 
exclusion of the Dalits could mean problem for both the micro hydro plant and the 
village. In addition, ensuring more inclusiveness across development projects like 
communal micro hydro plants is also in the interest of the nation as a whole.  
 
Developmentalism, since its birth in the mid 20th century with the establishment 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has viewed poverty as a purely 
technological problem having nothing to do with messy social sciences such as 
economics, politics, and anthropology. The establishment of the Ghandruk micro hydro 
plant was an effort in the same direction. From the research findings, we see that the 
donor funded development agencies working in Ghandruk were, for the large part, 
focused only on the technicalities of establishing a micro hydro plant and were to a large 
extent, out of touch with the socio-economic ground realities of the village. 
Consequently, the effort proved counterproductive as the micro hydro plant, instead of 
bringing wealth and prosperity, exacerbated existent socio-ethnic fragmentation within 
the village. If the ‘past’ Maoist insurgency and the ongoing upsurge in the plains of Nepal 
is anything to go by, one can see how the current situation in Ghandruk, partly created by 
development agencies, can contribute towards further dividing the country. Thus, the key 
lesson learned from the analysis is as follows: if donor funded development agencies 
truly intend to help the poor; they should, prior to starting development projects 
anywhere, gain an adequate understanding of socio-economic ground realities and plan 
their projects accordingly. The negative consequence of what happens when this is not 
done is evidenced by the case of the Ghandruk micro hydro plant.     
   
5. CONCLUSION   
 
The development of communal micro hydro power is extremely important for the 
development of Nepal. In the rugged and unstable regions of rural Nepal where a 
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majority of the people still burn fuel wood and kerosene for cooking and lighting, 
electrification through micro hydro is the only way out. Nonetheless, if the long run 
stability of such micro hydro plants is to be ensured, policy makers and planners should 
tackle caste-based exclusion in Nepal’s communal micro hydro plants with the 
seriousness it deserves. The three main factors that limit the access of excluded groups 
from access to electricity are their financial status, social status, and lack of awareness. 
Policy makers should be well aware of these factors and plan accordingly when installing 
a new micro hydro plant anywhere. Financially supporting lower caste poorer groups by 
charging them less compared to others might be an option in dealing with the financial 
barriers that arise. Similarly, creating mechanisms to ensure that the ‘lower’ social status 
of excluded groups does not prevent them from asking for and getting the amount of 
electricity they deserve is crucial. Finally, it is very important that wherever a communal 
micro hydro project goes, villagers are first and foremost educated adequately of the 
benefits and uses of electricity.    
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